Secret handshake protocols were recently introduced [1] to allow members of the same group to authenticate each other secretly, in the sense that someone who is not a group member cannot tell, by engaging some party in the handshake protocol, whether that party is a member of this group. On the other hand, any two parties who are members of the same group will recognize each other as members. Thus, a secret handshake protocol can be used in any scenario where group members need to identify each other without revealing their group affiliations to outsiders.
Introduction
Problem Exposition. A secret handshake scheme, introduced by Balfanz et al. [1] , allows two members of the same group to identify each other secretly, in the sense that each party reveals his/her affiliation to the other only if the other party is also a group member. For example, a CIA agent Alice might want to authenticate herself to Bob, but only if Bob is also a CIA agent. Moreover, if Bob is not a CIA agent, the protocol should not help Bob in determining whether Alice is a CIA agent or not. This secrecy property can be extended to ensure that group members's affiliations are revealed only to members who hold specific roles in the group. For example, Alice might want to authenticate herself as a CIA agent with security level one if and only if Bob is a CIA agent with security clearance two, and vice versa.
In other words, if A is a member of group G a with role r a and B is a member of G b with role r b , a secret handshake scheme guarantees the following [1] :
• A and B authenticate each other if and only if G a = G b . 1 • If G a = G b then the only thing that either party learns is the sole fact that G a = G b .
• A can choose not to reveal anything about herself unless B is a member with particular role r b (and vice versa). 2 • An eavesdropper or a man in the middle learn nothing from the protocol.
As observed in [1] , secret handshakes seem to require new cryptographic protocols since they can not be easily obtained from existing tools in the "cryptographic toolbox". For example, 3 group signatures [2, 3] might appear to be an attractive building block for secret handshakes. However, they offer anonymity and unlinkability of group members' signatures, not secrecy of membership itself. In the interactive variant of group signatures, called identity escrow [4] , one party can prove to another its membership in a group in an anonymous fashion. However, what turns out to be quite difficult is the seemingly simple issue of two parties proving group membership to each other simultaneously, in such a way that one party never reveals its group membership to another unless the former is also a member of the same group.
Secret Handshake Scheme as a "CA-oblivious PKI". To be usable in practice, a secret handshake scheme must provide efficient revocation of any group member by the Group Authority (GA) which administers the group. To support this functionality we will consider secret handshake schemes which look very much like PKI's (Public Key Infrastructures), where the role of a group authority corresponds to that of a Certification Authority (CA) in a PKI. 4 Namely, to become a member of a group a party needs the GA to issue a certificate on an ID bitstring which the CA agrees to assign to this party. The certificate must include a CA-specific trapdoor which corresponds to this ID. 5 To revoke some party, the CA puts that party's ID on a revocation list. To perform a handshake, two parties first exchange their ID's, and then proceed only if the ID of the other party is not on the revocation list of their CA. Since the secret handshake protocol must hide one's group affiliation from outsiders, the IDs will be random strings picked from the same domain by all the CA's. 6 In this setting, constructing a secret handshake scheme amounts to solving the following protocol problem: For a given CA, Alice wants to prove to Bob that she posseses a trapdoor t A issued by this CA on her ID A , but only if Bob posseses a trapdoor t B issued by the same CA on his ID B (and vice versa). Moreover, the protocol must be "CA-oblivious" in the sense that if a cheating Bob is not in the group administered by a given CA, and hence does not hold a CA-specific trapdoor t B associated with ID B , then his interaction with Alice must not help him in guessing if Alice belongs to this group or not. (And vice versa for an honest Bob and a cheating Alice.) While this protocol problem can be solved in principle with general 2-party secure computation techniques, the issue remains whether it can be solved with a practical protocol, at a cost comparable to standard authentication protocols.
Existing solution based on bilinear maps. The secret handshake protocol of [1] is based on bilinear maps, which can be constructed using Weil pairings on elliptic curves [5, 6] . The protocol of [1] builds on the non-interactive key-agreement scheme of [7] , and works as follows. As in the identity based encryption scheme of [8] , A and B can compute each other's public keys from each other's ID's and from the public parameters associated with the CA. If Alice is a group member, she can use her trapdoor t A corresponding to P K A to non-interactively compute a session key from (t A , P K B ). Similarly, if Bob is a group member he can compute the same session key from (t B , P K A ). The two parties can then verify if they computed the same key via a standard MAC-based challenge-response protocol. Under the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) assumption, it is easy to show (in the Random Oracle Model) that an attacker who does not hold the correct trapdoor cannot compute the session 3 See [1] for a discussion of the unsuitability of other seemingly related constructs. See also Related Work below. 4 The SH scheme of [1] also falls in this category. 5 For example, in an identity based encryption scheme, the trapdoor is a secret key corresponding to the public key which can be recovered from ID and the public parameters associated with the CA. In a standard PKI system, this correspondence has an added level of indirection: The trapdoor t is a secret key corresponding to the public key P K which is in turn bound to the ID string by a signature of CA on the (ID|P K) pair. 6 Optionally, to make protocol runs executed by the same party unlinkable, Balfanz et al. [1] propose that a single ID and its certificate could be used in only one instance of the handshake protocol. The CA would then issue multiple (ID,certificate) pairs to each member.
key. Moroever, the MAC-based challenge response confirmation protocol has the needed property that without the knowledge of the key, one learns nothing from the counterparty's responses.
Thus, the "CA-obliviousness" property of the protocol of [1] follows from two properties of cryptosystems built on bilinear maps: (1) that the receiver's public key can be recovered by the sender from the receiver's ID, and thus the receiver does not need to send any information revealing his CA affiliation to the sender, and (2) knowing their public keys, the two parties can establish a session key non-interactively, and thus they again do not reveal any CA-specific information. Given that the first property relies on identity based encryption, and that the only practical IBE known so far is based on bilinear maps [8] , 7 it seems that BDH is indeed needed for secret handshakes.
Our contributions. In this paper we show that efficient secret handshake (SH) schemes can be built using weaker and more standard assumptions than the BDH, namely the Computational Diffie Hellman (CDH) and the RSA assumptions, in the so-called Random Oracle Model (ROM).
First, we generalize the IBE-based secret handshake solution described above by showing that an efficient four-rounds secret handshake protocol can be built using any PKI-enabled encryption with the additional property of CA-obliviousness. We define the notion of (chosen-plaintext secure) PKI-enabled encryption, which generalizes both the Identity Based Encryption schemes, and the standard encryption schemes used in the context of a PKI system like X.509. We define the CAobliviousness property for a PKI-enabled encryption, which says that both the public-key-related information which the receiver provides to the sender, and the ciphertext sent from the sender to the receiver, do not reveal which CA issued the receiver's certificate. We then show that every CAoblivious PKI-enabled encryption leads to a four-round secret handshake protocol whose cost is one decryption and one encryption for each party.
Next, we combine ElGamal encryption and Schnorr signatures to construct a practical CAoblivious PKI-enabled encryption secure under the CDH assumption (in ROM), which thus leads to secret handshakes secure under CDH. We also note that the recent "oblivious envelope" construction of [10] , which is secure under the RSA assumption (in ROM), can be seen as a secure PKI-enabled encryption, and that with some minor changes it can also be made CA-oblivious and can thus be used to build an RSA-based SH scheme.
Both SH schemes constructed in this manner take four rounds, compared to three rounds in the SH scheme of [1] . However, we show that our CDH-based construction can be simplified to run in three rounds. Moreover, its computational cost is roughly three to five times lower than that of the BDH-based SH scheme of [1] .
Finally, we show that our SH schemes handle roles just as easily as the SH of [1] . We also show that our CDH-based SH schemes can support "blinded" issuance of the member certificates in the sense that the CA does not learn the trapdoors included in the certificate, and thus, in contrast to the BDH-based SH scheme of [1] , the CA cannot impersonate that member. Related Work. As described in [1] , existing anonymity tools such as anonymous credentials, group signatures, matchmaking protocols, or accumulators, have different goals than secret handshakes, and it is indeed unclear how to achieve a secret handshake scheme from any of them. However, the recent work of [10] proposes a notion of "oblivious signature-based envelopes", which is closely related to the secret handshake problem. In fact, the oblivious envelope notion they define is equivalent to a PKI-enabled encryption with half of our CA-obliviousness property. Namely, they only require that the identity of the CA is not revealed by the receiver-related information the sender needs to encrypt, while we also require the ciphertext produced by the sender to hide the identity of the CA.
The one-sided CA-obliviousness turns out to be enough for the application considered in [10] , in which two parties in a regular PKI system announce to each other the cleartexts of their public key certificates, which include the identities of the CA's which signed them, but do not want to reveal to one another the CA's signatures on their certificates unless the other party posseses the corresponding signature too. They thus offer a lower level of secrecy protection than a secret handshake would, since, in their protocol a party announces what CA issued its certificate, and they only want to hide the signature which proves the possession of this certificate. Nevertheless, the RSA-based encryption scheme given in [10] can be modified to provide the CA-obliviousness in both directions, and thus by our general transformation, it leads to an RSA-based Sescret Handshake scheme.
Organization. In section 2 we revise the definitions of an SH scheme [1] , restricting them to "PKIlike" SH schemes we consider here. In section 3 we define the notion of a PKI-enabled encryption, and the CA-obliviousness property of such encryption. In section 4 we give a general construction of an SH scheme from any CA-oblivious encryption. In section 5 we construct a CA-oblivious encryption secure under CDH in ROM, and we show how to adapt the RSA-based encryption of [10] to make it CA-oblivious. In appendix B we show how to simplify the CDH-based SH scheme so that it is about 3 to 5 times more efficient than the BDH-based SH scheme of [1] . In appendix C we show how to support roles and blinded issuing of CA certificates.
Secret Handshake Definition
We adapt the definition of a secure Secret Handshake [SH] scheme from [1] to what we call "PKIlike" SH schemes. Our definitions might potentially restrict the notion of a Handshake Scheme, but both the SH schemes of [1] and ours fall into this category. An SH scheme is a tuple of probabilistic algorithms Setup, CreateGroup, AddMember, and Handshake s.t.
• Setup is an algorithm executed publicly on the high-enough security parameter k, to generate the public parameters params common to all subsequently generated groups.
• CreateGroup is a key generation algorithm executed by a GA, which, on input of params, outputs the group public key G, and the GA's private key t G .
• AddMember is a protocol executed between a group member and the GA on GA's input t G and shared inputs: params, G, and the bitstring ID (called a pseudonym in [1] ) of size regulated by params. The group member's private output is the trapdoor t produced by GA for the above ID.
• Handshake is the authentication protocol, i.e. the SH protocol itself, executed between players A, B on public input ID A , ID B , and params. The private input of A is (t A , G A ) and the private input of B is (t B , G B ). The output of the protocol for either party is either a reject or accept.
We note that AddMember can be executed multiple times for the same group member, resulting in multiple (ID, t) authentication tokens for that member. We also note that in all the SH schemes discussed here the output of the Handshake protocol can be extended to include an authenticated session key along with the "accept" decision.
Basic Security Properties
A secure SH scheme must be complete, impersonator resistant, and detector resistant: 8 8 Once we restrict the notion of SH Schemes to the PKI-like SH schemes, the security properties defined originally in [1] can be stated in a simpler way. Specifically, their properties of impersonator resistance and impersonator tracing are subsumed by our impersonator resistance, and their detector resistance and tracing is subsumed by what we call detector resistance.
Completeness. If two honest memebers A, B of the same group engage in Handshake with valid trapdoors t A , t B generated for their ID strings ID A , ID B and for the same group G A = G B , then both parties output "accept" at the end of the protocol.
Impersonator Resistance. Intuitively, the impersonator resistance property is violated if an honest party V who is a member of group G authenticates an adversary A as a group member, even though the A is not a member of G. Formally, we say that an SH scheme is impersonator resistant if every polynomially bounded adversary A has negligible probability of winning in the following game, for any string ID V which models the ID string of the victim in the impersonation attack:
1. The Setup and the CreateGroup algorithms are executed: 
4.
A interacts with the honest player V in the Handshake protocol, on common inputs (ID A , ID V ), and on V 's private inputs G and t V , where
We say that A wins if V outputs "accept" in the above Handshake instance. We note that stronger versions of the impersonator resistance property are possible. For example, the attacker can be allowed to ask for trapdoors on additional ID i = ID A strings during the Handshake protocol against the intended victim V . Also, the attacker can be allowed to have several attempts against V and be able to ask for additional trapdoors after each attempt, before he announces that he is ready for the true challenge. We adopt the simpler definition here to reduce the level of formalism, although the schemes we propose remain secure under these stronger notions as well.
Detector Resistance. Intuitively, an adversary A violates the detector resistance property if it can decide whether some honest party V is a member of some group G, even though A is not a member of G. Formally, we say that an SH scheme is detector resistant if there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm SIM , s.t. any polynomially bounded adversary A cannot distinguish between the following two games with the probability which is non-negligibly higher than 1/2, for any target ID string ID V : 1-3. Steps 1-3 proceed as in the definition of Impersonator Resistance, i.e. on input ID V and a randomly generated G, A querries GA on adaptively chosen ID i 's and announces some challenge string ID A , ID A = ID i for all i.
4-1. In game 1, A interacts with an algorithm for the honest player V in the Handshake protocol, on common inputs (ID A , ID V ), and on V 's private inputs G and t V = AddMember((G, ID V ), t G ).
4-2. In game 2, A interacts with the SIM algorithm on common inputs (ID A , ID V ). (Note that SIM has no private inputs.)
5.
A can query GA on additional strings ID i = ID A .
6. A outputs "1" or "2", making a judgment about which game he participated in.
Again, stronger notions of the detector resistance are possible. However, we adopt this relatively simple definition in order to reduce the level of formalism.
Other Security Properties
Authenticated Key Exchange. In practice one would like to extend the notion of a secret handshake from mere authentication, where participants' outputs are binary decisions "accept"/"reject", to authenticated key exchange, where parties output instead either "reject" or an identifier of an authenticated session and a session key. Our SH schemes, just like the original SH protocol of [1] are in fact easily extendible to AKE protocols. (Formal arguments of AKE security would require extending the AKE formalism of [11, 12] , which is beyond the scope of this paper.)
Group-Affiliation Secrecy against Eavesdroppers. Our schemes also protect secrecy of participants' group affiliations against eavesdroppers, even if the eavesdropper is a malicious member of the same group. An observer of our SH protocols does not even learn if the participants belong to the same group or not. We do not formally define security against eavesdroppers, because it is very similar to the security against active attackers which we do define, the impersonator and detector resistance. Moreover, if the protocol participants first establish a secure anonymous session, e.g. using SSL or IKE, and then run the SH protocol over it, the resulting protocol is trivially secure against eavesdroppers.
Unlinkability. A potentially desirable property identified by Balfanz et al. [1] , is unlinkability, which extends privacy protection for group members by requiring that instances of the handshake protocol performed by the same party cannot be efficiently linked. This can be achieved trivially (but inefficiently) by issuing to each group member a list of one-time certificates, each issued on a randomly chosen ID, to be discarded after a single use. Unfortunately, an honest member's supply of one-time certificates can be depleted by an active attacker who initiates the handshake protocol enough times. Indeed, while one can run our SH schemes using multiple certifciates to offer some heuristic protections against linking, contructing an efficient and perfectly unlinkable SH scheme remains an open problem.
PKI-enabled encryption
We define the notion of PKI-enabled encryption, which models the use of standard encryption in the context of a PKI system, and also generalizes Identity Based Encryption. We define one-way security for PKI-enabled encryption, adapting a standard (although weak) notion of one-way security of encryption to our context, and we define a novel CA-obliviousness property for such schemes.
A PKI-enabled encryption is defined by the following algorithms:
• Initialize is run on a high-enough security parameter, k, to generate the public parameters params common to all subsequently generated Certification Authorities (CAs).
• CAInit is a key generation algorithm executed by a CA. It takes as inputs the system parameters params and returns the public key G and the private key t G of the CA.
• Certify is a protocol executed between a CA and a user who needs to be certified by this CA. It takes CA's private input t G , and public inputs G (assume that G encodes params) and string ID which identifies the user, and returns trapdoor t and certificate ω as the user's outputs.
• Recover is an algorithm used by a sender, a party who wants to send an encrypted message to a user identified by some string ID, to recover that user's public key. It takes as inputs G, ID, and ω, and outputs a public key P K.
• Encrypt is the actual encryption algorithm which takes inputs message m and the public key P K (assume that P K encodes params and G), and outputs a ciphertext c.
• Decrypt is the decryption algorithm which takes as inputs the ciphertext c and the trapdoor t (as well as possibly params, G, ID, and ω, all of which can be encoded in t), and returns m.
The above algorithms must satisfy the obvious correctness property that the decryption procedure always inverts encryption correctly.
It is easy to see (see Appendix A) that this notion of encryption indeed models both regular encryption schemes in the PKI context as well as the Identity Based encryption schemes.
One-Way Security. We define the security of PKI-enabled encryption only in the relatively weak sense of so-called one-way security, namely that the attacker who does not own a trapdoor for some public key cannot decrypt an encryption of a random message. This is a weaker notion than the standard semantic security for an encryption, but we adopt it here because (1) it simplifies the definition of security, (2) one-way security is all we need in our construction of a secure SH scheme, and (3) in the Random Oracle Model, it is always possible to convert a one-way secure encryption into a semantically secure encryption, or even a CCA-secure encryption using the method of Fujisaki and Okamoto [13] .
The definition of security for PKI-enabled encryption is very simliar to the definition of security of an IBE scheme: We say that a PKI-enabled encryption scheme is One-Way (OW) secure on message space M under Chosen-Plaintext Attack (CPA), if every polynomially-bounded adversary A has only negligible probability of winning the following game:
1. The Initialize and CAInit algorithms are run, and the resulting public key G is given to A.
2.
A repeatedly triggers the Certify protocol under the public key G, on ID strings ID i of A's choice. In each instance A receives (t i , ω i ) from the CA.
3.
A announces a pair (ID A , ω), where ID A = ID i for all ID i 's querried above.
4.
A receives c = Encrypt P K (m) for a random message m ∈ M and P K = Recover(G, ID A , ω).
5.
A is allowed to trigger the Certify algorithm on new ID i = ID A strings of his choice, getting additional (t i , ω i ) pairs from the CA.
6.
A outputs a message m ′ .
We say that A wins in the above game if m = m ′ .
CA-Obliviousness. Informally, PKI-enabled encryption is CA-oblivious if (1) the receiver's message to the sender, i.e., the pair (ID, ω), hides the identity of the CA which certified this ID; and (2) the sender's messages to the receiver, i.e., ciphertexts, do not leak any information about the CA which the sender assumed in computing the receiver's public key. Consequentely, in a standard exchange of messages between the receiver and the sender, neither party can guess which CA is assumed by the other one. Formally, we call a PKI-enabled encryption scheme CA-oblivious under two conditions:
(I) It is receiver CA-oblivious, i.e., if there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm SIM (R) , s.t. no polynomially-bounded adversary A can distinguish between the following two games with probability non-negligibly higher than 1/2, for any target ID string ID R :
1. The Initialize and CAInit algorithms are executed, and the resulting parameters params and the public key G is given to A.
2.
A can trigger the Certify protocol on any number of ID i 's.
3-1. In game 1, A gets (ID R , ω R ), where ω R is output by the Certify protocol on G and ID R .
3-2. In game 2, A gets (ID R , r) where r = SIM (R) (params).
4.
A can trigger the Certify protocol some more on any ID i = ID R .
5.
A outputs "1" or "2", making a judgment about which game he participated in.
(II) It is sender CA-oblivious, i.e., if there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm SIM (S) s.t. no polynomially-bounded adversary A can distinguish between the following two games, with probability non-negligibly higher than 1/2:
2.
A can trigger the Certify protocol any number of times, for public key G and group members ID i 's of A's choice.
3.
A announces pair (ID R , ω R ) on which he wants to be tested, where ID R = ID i for all i.
4-1.
In game 1, A gets c = Encrypt P K R (m) for random m ∈ M and P K R = Recover(G, ID R , ω R ).
4-2. In game 2,
A gets c = SIM (S) (params).
5.
A can query GA on some more ID i 's s.t. ∀ i , ID i = ID R .
Secret Handshakes from CA-Oblivious Encryption
We show how to built a secure SH scheme using CA-oblivious PKI-enabled encryption. Given a CA-oblivious one-way secure PKI-enabled encryption scheme (Initialize, CAInit, Certify, Recover, Encrypt, Decrypt), and a hash function H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} k modeled as a random oracle, we specify a secret handshake scheme as follows: Algorithms Setup, CreateGroup, and AddMember, are simply set to Initialize, CAInit, and Certify, respectively, while algorithm Handshake proceeds as follows. A's inputs are (ID a , ω a , t a ) and B's inputs are (ID b , ω b , t b ). 9 
SH-1 (A ←− B): ID b , ω b
A does the following:
2. SH-2 (A −→ B): ID a , ω a , C a , ch a B does the following:
e) computes resp b = H(r a , r b , ch a ) 9 Group member's trapdoor on string ID in this SH scheme is a pair (ω, t) produced by the Certify protocol. We can also assume that (IDa, ID b ) are public inputs. We note that the above protocol can be easily turned into an Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) protocol (secure in the ROM model) if the two parties compute their authenticated session key as K = H(r a , r b ).
Theorem 1 If the PKI-enabled encryption is CA-oblivious and One-Way (Chosen-Plaintext Attack) Secure, the above construction yields a Secret Handshake scheme secure in the Random Oracle Model (ROM).
Proof of Impersonator Resistance (sketch):
Assume that A violates with non-negligible probability ǫ the impersonator resistance property against some honest member V identified by ID V . Assume that A plays the role of A and V plays the role of B (the other case is easier because B has to speak first). Therefore with prob. ǫ, A sends a valid resp a = H(r a , r b , ch b ) response to B. In the ROM model, that can happen with non-negligible probability only if A querries the oracle for H(·) on the input (r a , r b , ch b ) s.t., in particular, r b was the value picked by V and sent to A in the form of a ciphertext C b = Encrypt P Ka (r b ) for P K a = Recover (G, ID a , ω a ) , where (ID a , ω a ) are sent by A in its first message to V . Therefore, in ROM, we can use A to create a break A ′ against the one-way security of the encryption scheme:
On input G, A ′ passes the public key G to A. When A can makes a querry ID i , so does A ′ , passing back (t i , ω i ) to A. When A announces that he is ready for the impersonation challenge against V , A ′ passes as his encryption challenge the pair (ID a , ω a ) sent by A in his first message to V . On encryption challenge c = Encrypt P Ka (m) where m is chosen at random in M, A ′ passes the same challenge as its response C b = c to A, together with a random challenge value ch b and resp b picked at random. The only way A can tell between this communication and a conversation with an honest V is by querying H on (r a , r b , ch a ) for r b = Decrypt ta (C b ) = m. Otherwise, as we argued above, he queries H on (r a , r b , ch b ) with probability almost ǫ. In either case, since A can make only polynomially-many queries to H, A ′ can pick one such query at random, and A ′ will have a non-negligible chance of outputing r b = m. Thus A ′ breaks the one-wayness of the encryption scheme.
2
Proof of Detector Resistance (sketch): We will show a simulator SIM s.t. if A distinguishes between interactions with SIM and interactions with a group member, we can break the one-way security of the encryption scheme. Assume again that the adversary A plays the role of A and V plays the role of B. Assume that the underlying encryption scheme is CA-oblivious, and therefore there exist simulators SIM (S) and SIM (R) which satisfy the two CA-obliviousness criteria. We define a simulator SIM , running on input (ID A , ID V , params), as follows: (1) To simulate V 's first message SH-1, SIM sends ID b = ID V together with ω b = SIM (R) (params), (2) To simulate B's second message SH-3, SIM sends resp b and ch b picked at random, and C b = SIM (S) (params).
If A can distinguish a conversation with such SIM from a conversation with a true group member V , then by a standard hybrid argument, since the SIM (S) and SIM (R) simulators produce messages which are indistinguishable from the messages of an honest B, it must be that A distinguishes random values resp b chosen by SIM from values resp b = H(r a , r b , ch a ) computed by a real player. But this can happen only if A makes an oracle query on the triple (r a , r b , ch a ), in which case we can use A, exactly in the same manner as we did in the proof of impersonator resistance, to attack the one-way security of the underlying encryption scheme. 2
CA-Oblivious Encryption Schemes: Constructions
We show two constructions for CA-oblivious PKI-enabled encryption schemes, based on the CDH and RSA assumptions, respectively, all in the Random Oracle Model. The CDH-based scheme is novel, while the RSA-based scheme is a simple modification of the RSA-based encryption envelope proposed in [10] . By theorem 1, both constructions lead to secret handshake schemes secure under the respective assumptions. 10 
CDH-based encryption scheme
• Initialize picks the standard discrete logarithm parameters (p, q, g) of security k, i.e., primes p, q of size polynomial in k, s.t. g is a generator of a subgroup in Z * p of order q. Initialize also defines hash functions H : {0, 1} * → Z q and H ′ : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} k . (Both hash functions are modeled as random oracles, but we note that H ′ is not essential in this construction and can be easily removed.)
• CAInit picks random private key x ∈ Z q and public key y = g x modp.
• In Certify on public inputs (y, ID), the CA computes the Schnorr signature on string ID under the key y [14] , i.e., a pair (ω, t) ∈ (Z * p , Z q ) s.t. g t = ωy H(ω,ID) mod p. The user's outputs are the trapdoor t and the certificate ω. The signature is computed as ω = g r mod p and t = r + xH(ω, ID) mod q, for random r ← Z q .
• Recover(y, ID, ω) outputs P K = ωy H(ω,ID) mod p.
• Encrypt P K (m) is an ElGamal encryption of message m ∈ {0, 1} k under the public key P K:
• Decrypt is an ElGamal decryption, outputing m = c 2 ⊕ H ′ (c t 1 mod p).
Theorem 2
The above encryption scheme is CA-oblivious and One-Way (CPA) Secure under the CDH assumption in the Random Oracle Model.
Proof of One-Way Security (sketch): Assume that an adversary A breaks one-wayness of this encryption scheme. Then A receives n Schnorr signatures (t i , w i ) on ID i 's of his choice. Then A sends some tuple (ID, w) for ID = ID i for all the above ID i 's. If A breaks one-wayness then it must be computing c t 1 modp where g t = ωy H(ω,ID) mod p. Therefore, if A succeeds, then she can exponentiate a random element c 1 to t. Hence, what we need to argue that, even though A receives n signatures (t i , w i ) on her ID i 's, she cannot produce a new pair (ID, w) s.t. she can exponentiate a random elements c 1 to exponent t where g t = w * y h(t,ID) . Now, this is very similar to proving the chosen message attack security of the underlying Schnorr signature scheme, where one argues that, after receiving n signatures, A cannot produce a new triple (ID, t, w) s.t. g t = w * y h(w,ID) . Hence, our proof is very similar to the forking-lemma proof for Schnorr signature security in [15] . However, here we reduce the successful attack not to computing discrete logarithm, but to breaking the CDH assumption by computing m x on input y = g x and a random value m.
To reduce A's ability to succeed in this protocol to computing m x on the Diffie-Hellman challenge (g, g x , m), we first simulate, as in the proof of Schnorr signature security, the signatures (t i , w i ) that A gets on her ID i 's, by taking random t i , c i , computing ω i = g t i * y −c i modp, and assigning H(ID i , w i ) to c i . Since the verification equation is satisfied and t i , c i are picked at random, this is indistinguishable from receiving real signatures. As in the forking lemma argument of [15] , we can argue that if A's probability of success is ǫ, the probability that A executed twice in a row succeeds in both executions and sends the same (ID, w) pair in both of them, is at least ǫ 2 /q h where q h is the number of queries A makes to the hash function H (see [15] ). The forking lemma used in the security proof of the Schnorr signature scheme shows that if two conversations with an adversary produce triples (ID, t, w) and (ID,t, w), where in first conversation H(ID, r) = c and in the second H(ID, r) =ĉ for some random c,ĉ, then x = DL g (y) can be computed as x = (s−ŝ)/(c−ĉ) mod q, because g t = w * y c and gt = w * yt. By the same forking lemma applied to our case, adversary A produces two exponentiations m t and mt, instead of forgeries t,t, but still we have that x = DL g (y) = (t−t)/(c−ĉ). Therefore, with probability ǫ 2 /q h we can break the CDH challenge and compute m x = m (t−t)/(c−ĉ) = (m t /mt) 1/(c−ĉ) mod p.
Note that if the success probability ǫ is higher than negligible, and if A * is an efficient algorithm and hence the number of queries q h is polynomial, then the probability of CDH break ǫ 2 /q h is nonnegligible as well.
Proof of CA Obliviousness: It is easy to see that w and the ciphertext C = [c 1 , c 2 ] does not reveal any information about the CA i.e., that the proposed CDH-based encryption is CA-oblivious. Since ω = g r for random r, ω is independent from CA's public key y, and hence the scheme is receiver CA-oblivious. Ciphertext C = [c 1 , c 2 ] on a random message m is also independent from the group key y, because c 1 = g r for random r and c 2 is computed by xoring H ′ (P K r ) with the random m. 2
RSA-based encryption scheme
• Initialize defines k ′ polynomial in the security parameter k and two hash functions H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} 2k ′ and H ′ : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} k .
• CAInit picks e = 3 and an RSA modulus n = pq for |p| = |q| = k ′ , with additional restriction 2 2k ′ < n < 2 2k ′ +1 . The private RSA key is d = e −1 mod φ(n).
• Certify computes the RSA signature on ID under the key (d, n), i.e., s = H(ID) d mod n. It then picks t ← Z n and computes ω = s * (H(ID)) t mod n. For CA-obliviousness, if ω > 2 2k ′ then another t is chosen at random and ω is recomputed, until ω ≤ 2 2k ′ .
• Recover outputs P K = ω e /H(ID) mod n.
• Encrypt is an ElGamal encryption of k-bit message m under the public key P K modulo n. The sender picks t ∈ Z n and computes the ciphertext [c 1 , c 2 ] = [(h e ) r mod n, m ⊕ H ′ (P K r mod n)], where h = H(ID). Again, for CA obliviousness, if c 1 > 2 2k ′ then another r is chosen at random and ciphertext is recomputed, until c 1 ≤ 2 2k ′ .
• Decrypt returns m = c 2 ⊕ H ′ (c t 1 mod n).
Theorem 3
The above encryption scheme is CA-oblivious and One-Way (CPA) Secure under the RSA assumption in the Random Oracle Model.
Proof of One-Way Security: When H ′ is modelled as a random oracle, then an attack against one-wayness of this encryption scheme means that there exists a polynomially bounded adversary A s.t. A gets valid pairs (t i , w i ) on ID i 's of his choice from the CA, announces a pair (w, ID), s.t. ID i = ID, and then the challenger randomly picks r ← Z n , and sends c 1 = (h e ) r and some c 2 to A, where h = H(ID)modn. The adversary can then receive additional (t i , w i ) pairs on ID i 's of his choice, but finally A must make a query P K r = (w e /h) r mod n to H, because otherwise, in ROM, he has a negligible chance of outputing the correct decryption of [c 1 , c 2 ]. Given an attacker A that wins the above game with probability ǫ, we can construct another attacker B that can successfully forge the RSA signature H(ID) d modn with probability ǫ ′ , where |ǫ − ǫ ′ | is negligible. B does the following: (1) B computes H(ID), picks a randon value z in Z n and sends h (1+ez) to A. Note that h (1+z) = h (ed+ez) = h e(d+z) . A returns r = w * e (d+z) * h −(d+z) . B can then computes h d = w * e (d+z) * h z /r.
B succeeds in forging an RSA signature iff A wins the above game. This happens with probability ǫ ′ . What A receives from the Challenger in the first game is the distributed family {h er |r ∈ Z n }. What A receives from B in the second game is the distributed family {h e(d+z) |z ∈ Z n }. Since these two distribution families are statistically indistinguishable, |ǫ − ǫ ′ | is negligible.
Proof of CA Obliviousness: It is easy to see that w and the ciphertext C = [c 1 , c 2 ] does not reveal any information about the CA modulus n. If fact since w is choosen such that its value is always smaller than 2 2k ′ , the distribution families defined by w for two different values of n, n 1 and n 2 , are statistically indistinguishable. The same argument can be used for c 1 and c 2 . 2 2. CAInit picks random private key x ∈ Z q and public key y = g x modp.
3. In Certify on public inputs (y, ID), the CA computes the Schnorr signature of ID under the key y [14] , i.e., the signature on ID is a pair (ω, t) ∈ (Z * p , Z q ) s.t. g t = ω * y H(ω,ID) modp. The user's outputs are the trapdoor t and the certificate ω.
4. Recover(y, ID, ω) outputs P K = ω * y H(ω,ID) modp. The message space M = {0, 1} k .
The Handshake protocol:
The secret handshake protocol between Alice on inputs t A , (w A , ID A ), and y, and Bob on inputs t B , (w B , ID B ), and y, proceeds as follows: We show that the above scheme achieves the detector resistance and impersonator resistance properties under the CDH assumption in the Random Oracle Model, and therefore we have:
Theorem 4 In the Random Oracle Model, under the CDH assumption, the above secret handshake protocol is secure.
Intuitively, we show that to remain secure a malicious party A would have to use a w A which was not issued by the CA. We argue that in this case, the ability of A to authenticate itself (in the Random Oracle Model) is equivalent to his ability to compute the Diffie-Hellman key
where t A is defined by g t * A = Recover(w * A , y) and M B = Recover(w B , y). We then show that his ability to compute such exponentiation is equivalent to solving a computational Diffie-Hellman challenge and computing z x on input g, y, z, where y = g x .
Interestingly, the proof of the secrecy property is very similar to the proof of security. The ability of an adversary A, who does not have a valid group member certificate under the group key y, to tell if its participant in the secret handshake protocol is a member of the group under this public key, is equivalent to A being able himself to compute the proper authentication tag tag = H(K, τ ), after sending some value w * A which is again not issued by the CA. But in the Random Oracle Model this is again equivalent to A's ability to compute the Diffie-Hellman key K as above. Hence the same proof as the one in the Appendix for theorem 4 shows that existance of such adversary is equivalent to breaking the computational Diffie Hellman problem. Proof Assume that an adversary A receives n authentication tokens (t i , w i ) from a group of malicious colluding group members {A i }. This is equivalent to A receving n modified-Schnorr (message,signature) pairs (ID i , (t i , w i )). Suppose that A successfully authenticates in the secret handshake protocol to some honest party B. If A sends one of the received legimitate certificates (w i , ID i ) to B in the authentication protocol, the CA will immediately identify this certificate. Suppose then that A sends some (w, ID) different from any of the received certificates. We show that in that case, under the CDH assumption, the probability that A the authentication protocol is negligible. The reason is that if A passes the authentication protocol then he must compute the right authentication tag value v = h(K, τ ) where K = M t * t ′ modp, where t ′ is the Diffie-Hellman secret held by B, and M = g t modp is defined as Recover((w, ID), y) = wy h(w,ID) modp. In the Random Oracle Model of analysis, computing such value is possible, except for negligible guessing probability, only by quering the hash function on the correctly computed argument K. Therefore, in the ROM model, an adversary A who succeeds in this protocol must also output K = M t ′ = g t * t ′ as a query to the hash function. Note that A receives information about t ′ in the form of B's certificate w ′ , ID ′ ) which defines t ′ because it defines M ′ = Recover((w ′ , ID ′ ), y) where M ′ = g t ′ . In other words, A commits himself to t by sending M = g t (in the form of values (w, ID)), receives a random M ′ (in the form of values (w ′ , ID ′ )), and outputs K = M ′t . Therefore, if A succeeds then he can exponentiate a random element M ′ to value t committed to in M . Hence, what we need to argue in the proof of traceability is that even though A receives n (message,signature) pairs (m i , (w i , t i )) he cannot produce a new element (t, m) s.t. he can exponentiate random elements M ′ to exponent t where g t = M = wy h(w,m) . Now, this is very similar to proving the chosen message attack security of the underlying modified-Schnorr signature scheme, where one argues that, after receiving n (message,signature) pairs, A cannot produce a new triple (t, w, m) s.t. g t = wy h(w,m) . The proof is very similar to the forking-lemma proof for Schnorr signature security in [15] , but here we reduce the successfull attack not to computing discrete logarithm, but to breaking the CDH assumption by computing M ′x on input y = g x and a random value M ′ . (We will later on with the fact that our A does not get M ′ as such, but in the form of w ′ , m ′ . For now assume that A receives from B a random value M ′ in the authentication protocol.)
To reduce A's ability to succeed in this protocol to computing M ′x on the Diffie-Hellman challenge (g, y, M ′ ), we first simulate, as in the proof of Schnorr signature security, the signatures (t i , w i , m i ) that A gets by taking random t i , m i , c i , computing w i = g t i * y −c i modp, and assigning h(w i , m i ) to c i . Since the verification equation is satisfied and c i is picked at random, this is indistinguishable from receiving random (message,signature) pairs. As in the forking lemma argument of [15] , we can argue that if A's probability of success is ǫ, the probability that A executed twice in a row succeed in both executions and he sends the same C = (w, m) certificate in both of them, is at least ǫ 2 /q h where q h is the number of queries A makes to the hash function h (see [15] for the argument). The signature-scheme security argument shows that if with probability at least ǫ 2 /q h , two conversations with A produce triples (m, t, w) and (m,t, w), where in first conversation h(m, w) = c and in the second h(m, w) =ĉ for some random c,ĉ, then x = DL g (y) can be computed as x = (t −ŝ)/(c −ĉ) because g s = wy c and gt = wyĉ, and therefore y = g (t−t)/(c−ĉ) . Here, however, by the same forking lemma A does not produce two forgeries t andt, but two exponentiations K = M ′t andK = M ′t , but still we have that x = DL g (y) = (t −t)/(c −ĉ) because here again wea have that M = g t = wy c andM = gt = wyĉ. Therefore, with probability ǫ 2 /q h we break the CDH challenge and compute M ′x as (K/K) 1/(c−ĉ) = (M ′t−t ) 1/(c−ĉ) .
Note that if the success probability ǫ is higher than negligible, and if A is an efficient algorithm and hence the number of queries q h is polynomial, then the probability of CDH break ǫ 2 /q h is non-negligible as well.
Finally, we have to deal with the fact that A does not compute K = M ′t on any random M ′ he is given, but on M ′ = w ′ y h(m ′ ,w ′ ) where (m ′ , w ′ ) is sent to A by B. Therefore the reduction from CDH is slightly different but still succesful: For example, we can still break a CDH input challenge g, y, w ′ and compute w ′x by running the above simulation twice, using the same values m ′ , w ′ in the two simulations, but different values for h(m ′ , w ′ ): c ′ andĉ ′ . From the first succesful simulation we get M ′x = w ′x y xc ′ (because a conversation with A can be used to recover α = M ′x in the same way as argued above), and from the second we getα =M ′x = w ′x y xĉ ′ . Therefore αĉ ′ /α c ′ = w ′xĉ ′ /w ′xc ′ = (w ′x ) (ĉ ′ −c ′ ) , and hence we can break CDH and output w ′x by exponentiating the above entity to 1/(ĉ ′ − c ′ ).
